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C a m p a n d B u r l e s q u e : A S t u d y i n C o n t r a s t s 
J o h n A . D e g e n * 
The more things change, the more they stay the same. Two decades ago, 
Susan Sontag wrote an important essay in which she tried to give definition to 
a phenomenon which she found " n a m e d but never before described": " the 
sensibility . . . that goes by the cult name of ' C a m p ' " (275). Since then there 
has been much discussion of " c a m p " objects, and the word has passed into 
common parlance, but the precise meaning of camp still remains elusive. In a 
recent book, Camp: The Lie That Tells the Truth, Philip Core spends two 
hundred pages cataloguing people and things he considers " c a m p , " but aside 
from his cryptic title—drawn from a list of random and equally cryptic 
aphorisms he calls " C a m p R u l e s " ( " C a m p is character limited to context"; 
"Camp is an ephemeral fundamental" ; " C a m p is gender without genitals" 
[7])—Core never effectively defines camp or adds to our understanding of 
what makes something camp. Indeed, the most interesting use he makes of the 
word in the introduction to his book lies in his references to " the camp , " 
meaning informed cogniscenti who are aware of the " i n " joke, which tends to 
imply that he uses camp as if it were a synonym for cult, in both its nominative 
and adjectival senses. 
In the theatre, we use the term camp with some frequency. Charles Busch's 
current off-Broadway hit, The Vampire Lesbians of Sodom, is described as an 
exercise in camp, as if the term were self-explanatory. A particular production 
or aspect of a production is described as " campy . " But the specific meaning of 
such descriptions is not always clear, since some critics use the term camp 
affectionately, while others use it as a pejorative. Does one "sink to the level of 
camp," or does one rather achieve a "wonderfully campy style"? 
It is not my purpose in this paper to attempt a new definition of camp, but 
I will attempt to bring a new perspective to the question of camp in theatrical 
production by comparing camp, in its various manifestations, to another form 
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of theatrical mockery, burlesque, and so to define at least the difference 
between a camp treatment and a burlesque treatment. 
The nature of burlesque—in the classic sense—is generally agreed upon. 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary describes it as " a literary or dramatic work 
that seeks to ridicule by means of grotesque exaggeration or comic imitation," 
while the unabridged Random House Dictionary declares it " a n artistic composi-
tion . . . which, for the sake of laughter, vulgarizes lofty material or treats 
ordinary material with mock dignity." This sort of burlesque has been 
popular over the centuries; indeed, a good operative definition was offered by 
Henry Fielding in his preface to Joseph Andrews, wherein he describes 
burlesque as "what is monstrous and unnatural , and where our delight, if we 
examine it, arises from the surprising absurdity, as in appropriating the 
manners of the highest to the lowest, or e converso" (I:vii). The goal of 
burlesque is light-hearted critical laughter directed at a familiar object; its 
method, variously described in dictionary definitions as ' 'ludicrous represen-
tation" and "mock exaggeration," is generally the depiction of the familiar in 
an unfamiliar guise, juxtaposing the high and the low, the vulgar and the 
sublime, the serious and the frivolous. What was serious and pretentious is 
good-naturedly deflated—made ridiculous—merely "for the fun of i t ." 
On this level, one might be tempted to think of camp and burlesque as 
synonyms. There are certainly parallels suggested in the unabridged Random 
House Dictionary's definition of camp as "an ironic or amusing quality present 
in an extravagant gesture, style, or form, especially when inappropriate or out 
of proportion to the content that is expressed." The parameters which Sontag 
offers for the camp sensibility similarly reflect the burlesque impulse. Early in 
her essay, she practically echoes Fielding's definition of burlesque when she 
declares that " the essence of Camp is its love of the unnatural: of artifice and 
exaggeration" (275) and that camp is " a sensibility that, among other things, 
converts the serious into the frivolous" (276). Later she expands on this 
aspect: "The whole point of Camp is to dethrone the serious. More precisely, 
Camp involves a new, more complex relation to 'the serious.' One can be 
serious about the frivolous, frivolous about the serious" (288). 
Given these parallels, what then separates camp from burlesque? As 
Sontag makes clear in her essay, camp is, to use her term, a sensibility, a way 
of looking at things. To take one of her examples, a Tiffany lamp may be 
viewed as a camp object because its ostentation, its elaborateness—however 
serious the intent—outstrips its function as a lamp. Thus its "unnatural-
ness," its sense of "artifice" and "exaggeration," its degree of excess leave it 
open to mockery, to ridicule—albeit affectionate ridicule. " C a m p , " she 
writes, "sees everything in quotation marks. It 's not a lamp, but a ' lamp' " 
(280). Anything carried to excess is liable to become camp. Thus any such 
example of "flamboyant femaleness" as Jayne Mansfield or any of the "grea t 
stylists of temperament and mannerism" like Tallulah Bankhead may become 
camp objects. 
Herein lies the problem of defining camp. As it deals with a personal 
sensiblity towards an existing object, camp (like beauty) is in the eye of the 
beholder. The "ironic or amusing quality present in an extravagant gesture, 
style, or form" (to cite the dictionary definition)—as well as the " i n a p -
propriateness to the content that is expressed"—depends on one's particular 
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interpretation and one's peculiarities of taste; one man ' s camp is another 
man's art. The same Tiffany lamp that strikes one person as camp may strike 
another as a masterpiece of design. The Tallulah Bankhead mannerisms that 
seem to some absurd—and thus campy—may seem to others merely compo-
nents of a consummate artiste. 
In sum, the attribution of camp status is not creative but rather 
interpretive, because we are dealing with a single creative effort. For 
something to be camp, to be a camp object, it must be a made thing, a work of 
art (whether of the fine or the practical arts). Gamp, as Sontag notes, does not 
exist in nature. "All Camp objects, and persons, contain a large element of 
artifice" (279). As the definition of camp implies, it is the excess of artifice, the 
extent to which style seems inappropriately extravagant in terms of content, 
that determines camp. In some cases, the excess, the extravagance, may be 
intentional; more typically, however, it is unintentional. To draw examples 
from the performing arts, The Vampire Lesbians of Sodom on the stage and The 
Rocky Horror Picture Show on the screen are deliberately outrageous; they are 
instances of self-conscious camp—what Sontag calls " C a m p which knows 
itself to be C a m p " and what the dictionary definition would designate "high 
camp." But such hysterical propaganda melodramas of the 1930s as Sex 
Madness or Reefer Madness on the screen and Florence Foster Jenkins on the 
concert stage constitute unintentional camp, because they were motivated by 
an earnestness, a seriousness, a high-mindedness which simply fails, at least 
for most of us. But whatever the motive, each of these examples remains a 
specific artistic entity, proffered for an audience's interpretive judgment. 
While it is foolish to see self-conscious camp as anything else, any art work 
undertaken seriously need not necessarily be viewed as camp, no matter how 
absurd most of us may find it. I 'm sure that even today, those suffering from 
venereal disease do not find Sex Madness campy fun and those for whom the use 
and abuse of marijuana is an extremely serious matter fail to see the humor 
most of us find in Reefer Madness. 
This is the key issue in the determination of camp status. While the fact 
that one views an object as camp does not deny the seriousness behind that 
object, it does mean that he or she does not feel that the seriousness of the 
intent justifies the excess in execution. " C a m p , " to quote Susan Sontag once 
again, "is art that proposes itself too seriously, but cannot be taken altogether 
seriously because it is ' too much ' " (284). We do not condemn the things we 
view as camp; to condemn them would be to imply that they have a real—and 
probably a threatening—seriousness that would remove them from the realm 
of camp. Neither camp nor burlesque deals in moral or ethical questions. 
Indeed, Victor Clinton-Baddeley's claim that burlesque avoids the righteous 
anger of satire might as easily apply to camp. Burlesque, writes Clinton-
Baddeley: 
is never angry, because its criticism is directed not against faults of 
virtue, but against faults of style and humour. It wants to destroy 
nothing—not even sententiousness, its dearest enemy; for if senten-
tiousness were dead there would be one less joke in the world to laugh 
at. . . . Satire is the schoolmaster attacking dishonesty with a whip. 
Burlesque is the rude boy attacking pomposity with a pea-shooter. . . . 
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[Burlesque] shows the world, not how contemptible it is, but how 
funny. Satire must laugh not to weep. Burlesque must laugh not to 
burst—and best of all it likes to laugh among friends, for burlesque 
finds laughter not in the object of its hatred but rather in the objects of 
its affection. (1-2) 
Camp, too, finds laughter in the objects "not of its hatred . . . but rather of its 
affection." The laughter of camp, like that of burlesque, is good-natured. We 
laugh at the things we view as camp because we are amused by them, because 
we find them silly, not objectionable. 
But as we cannot view as camp an object or a personality which we find 
seriously objectionable, neither can we view as camp an object or a personality 
for which we have serious reverence. This is a major point of contrast between 
camp and burlesque. Because a burlesque of an existing play (or novel or film 
or opera or whatever) is a separate, albeit parasitic work, it stands apart from 
the object of its laughter and thus can be considered and evaluated without 
passing judgment on the original. Burlesque is, as its definitions declare, " a 
literary or dramatic work," " a n artistic composition" in its own right, and 
while one may argue that it is a good or a bad burlesque, one cannot argue 
whether it is or is not a burlesque, as one can argue whether something is or is 
not camp. 
This point becomes clear if we submit the words to a syntactical test. When 
used as a noun or adjective, burlesque does not easily operate without an 
object. If we say, "This is a burlesque," the statement begs the question, " A 
burlesque of what?" The same situation applies when we use the word as an 
adjective—"a burlesque treatment of what?" Burlesque in its classic sense 
always relates to some other object, from which it is a separate entity. It may 
be a burlesque of a particular work of art (a specific play, say, or film) or of an 
entire genre (such as melodrama or grand opera), but it remains a thing apart, 
an intentionally extravagant and silly bastardization of the original, depend-
ing for much of its humor on a familiarity with the original, the better to 
appreciate the humor of the comic distortion. 
When camp is used as a noun or an adjective, however, it rarely tolerates 
an object. When something is designated as camp, no one asks " A camp of 
what?"; the very phrase is absurd. Similarly, the notion of camp as an 
adjective (except in such terms as " a camp object") is somewhat absurd, 
because when we say that something is camp, we mean it in the appositive 
rather than the adjectival sense. One doesn't refer to a camp Tiffany lamp or a 
camp Tallulah Bankhead; either we see the lamp or Miss Bankhead as camp 
or we don't . Camp does not exist apart from the object to which the term is 
applied; it is merely, to use Sontag's word, a "sensibility," not an independ-
ent entity. 
The distinction becomes blurred only when we use camp in what Sontag 
terms " the vulgar use of the word" (281)—as a verb—and then only when we 
use it as a transitive verb. The distinction between camp and burlesque 
remains clear when we consider the use of the words as intransitive verbs. O n e 
cannot burlesque in the intransitive; if one were to announce " I a m 
burlesquing," we would immediately ask, "Burlesquing what?" As we have 
noted, burlesque requires an object, and intransitive verbs do not take an 
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object. But one can say, in the intransitive sense, " I am camping," which 
simply means behaving outrageously. Camping, in the intransitive sense, is 
the sort of behavior that marks self-concious camp (or "high camp")—from 
the stereotypical drag queen to The Vampire Lesbians of Sodom—and while 
Sontag finds it "usually less satisfying" (282) than unintentional camp, it is 
nonetheless an appropriate manifestation of camp, because it has no object 
beyond its own outrageousness, its own overbearing artificiality. 
When camp assumes the dimensions of a transitive verb, however—when 
we speak of camping something—it surpassess the bounds of true camp and 
invades the province of burlesque. To camp in this sense is to impose 
something on an original—or, in the words of the unabridged Random House 
Dictionary, " to perform or imbue (something) with an ostentatious, affected, 
or heavily ornate m a n n e r . " To camp in this sense is not merely to interpret 
something as camp, but to alter it so that it conforms only to the camp 
interpretation, so that is is no longer open to serious interpretation. It then 
becomes not camp, but camp&f, made camp whether it might be so viewed or 
not in its original form. It is an act of mocking distortion, which robs its object 
of any pretense to seriousness or dignity which it might originally have had. 
Such camping is of especial concern to those of us in the performing arts, 
for one clearly can camp only in performance. One cannot camp a Tiffany 
lamp, for instance; that could be done only by making an outrageous version 
of a Tiffany lamp, a caricature—which would then be a burlesque version, 
because it would exist alongside the original lamp, which would remain 
unchanged. One might enjoy, be amused by the caricature, yet still view the 
original as a masterpiece. The same applies to any work which remains solely 
on the printed page, such as a novel or a poem; these can be burlesqued or 
parodied or travestied (caricature, parody and travesty are frequently listed as 
synonyms for burlesque), but they cannot be camp&/. Camping a play or an 
opera—intentionally performing the actual play or opera in an outrageous, 
inappropriate manner—supplants the original in a manner wholly inappropri-
ate to burlesque. 
It might seem at first glance that camping in this sense merely constitutes a 
sort of poor man ' s version of burlesque, since like burlesque it mocks the 
original by rendering it absurd. Indeed, such confusion has been promulgated 
with some frequency; in his collection of synopses of American plays, for 
instance, John Lovell, J r . , informed his readers that The Drunkard, that old 
temperance melodrama from the 1840s, has in recent years been "replayed as 
burlesque melodrama to audiences who found its original purpose most 
laughable" (56, my italics). But burlesque, we must bear in mind, is "an 
artistic composition" in its own right, even though it is dependent upon a 
familiar original. It does not rob the original of its dignity, because it exists 
apart from the original, and what indignity it generates is ultimately its own. 
Burlesque is an act of creation; it pays its original a compliment in 
acknowledging it worthy of the effort to burlesque it, if only in suggesting that 
it is sufficiently familiar to support burlesquing. 
Camping an existing work is, on the other hand, an act of destruction, 
because instead of creating a parallel tangible artistic work, it alters the form 
and denies the intergrity of the original. Let us take as an example that old 
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chestnut of a spectral melodrama, the Balderstone/Deane Dracula. It was 
written with the object of sincerely terrifying its audience—with comedy 
relegated to a few scenes between the servants—and on the whole, it certainly 
seems to have succeeded, both in its stage version and in its subsequent 
incarnation on film. Time and taste, however, have evolved since the play's 
composition, so that there are now many who find its melodramatic excesses 
and its somewhat tortuous convolutions unbelievably artifical. For such 
people, the play and/or film have become, tout a fait, camp. The film is still 
widely seen, and there are some who look on it as camp and others who view it 
as a serious cinematic classic. The same holds true for the play in its written 
text; whether or not it is a camp object is open to interpretation. Existing 
alongside the original play and film are several spoofs of the Dracula story, of 
which Ted Tiller's Count Dracula, Rick Abbot's Dracula: The Musical?, and the 
film Love at First Bite may serve as recent examples. The spoofs are, of course, 
meant to be played for laughs; they are, after all, burlesques, which do not 
reflect on the quality or seriousness of the original Dracula and which do not 
constitute camp (unless self-conscious camp) because they were not conceived 
with any serious intent. But not infrequently, producing organizations ignore 
the burlesques of Dracula and choose to camp the original play with the aim of 
arousing laughter rather than chills by emphasizing its old-fashioned ar-
tificialities so as to force them into prominence. Rather than offering a 
burlesque which would allow the original to retain its dignity, they are offering 
neither the original in its own right nor a legitimate burlesque, but rather an 
irreverent convolution of that original which assumes that the camp vision of 
the play is the only one which the audience need see. They are doing to Dracula 
what Prof. Lovell said that modern companies have done to The Drunkard— 
attempting to " replay" it in a "bur lesque ' ' version—but as the original text is 
being used, it is not burlesque, but rather an exercise in camping, in which the 
serious original is lost. One cannot " rep lay" an original as burlesque; one can 
only camp it. The movie version of the original Dracula, on the other hand, 
retains its serious intent, and so we, the audience, are permitted the 
opportunity to be thrilled or amused by it as our particular sensibilities 
dictate. It might be burlesqued in another film, or it might be considered camp, 
but it cannot be camped. 
Is there something inherently wrong with camping a preexisting work? 
That too is probably a matter of taste. It is as presumptuous to damn the 
enjoyment that some take in camping the artistic efforts of others as it is to 
determine that a serious work should be presented disrespectfully rather than 
letting it stand on its own merits. The former, I suppose, smacks as much of 
critical snobbery as the latter does of artistic narcissism. Actually, the only 
harm that such camping does is in robbing an audience of the opportunity to 
judge for itself the quality of an unfamiliar work. And in fairness, it must be 
admitted that one could also argue that if the producing agency were to abjure 
camping the work, and were to try to present the work with a serious intent to 
do it justice, but then did it badly, the production would have avoided 
camping, but would become—camp. 
Despite a personal antipathy towards camping (in the transitive sense), my 
ultimate aim in this article is not to place a value judgment on camping as a 
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production approach. But I have tried to establish the distinction between 
burlesque on the one hand and camp—and especially camping—on the other. 
Burlesque and camp are essentially quite different from one another. Bur-
lesque is an artistic treatment of a preexisting work of art; it mocks its object, 
but it stands apart from it, and its mockery is not judgmental. When Carol 
Burnett offers a ludicrous twenty-minute condensation of Gone with the Wind 
on her television show, she is not impugning the dignity of the classic film, but 
rather creating an independent burlesque skit which rises and falls on its own 
merits; the fact that the skit is not remotely serious does not in any way affect 
the seriousness with which she may view the original. Camp, on the other 
hand, is an artistic perception, a "sensibil i ty" as Sontag would have it, which 
neither creates an independent work nor transforms its object. Only when 
camp takes on the sense of a transitive verb does it intrude into the creative 
process, and then it does not truly create, but rather demeans; it becomes 
destructive rather than creative. Camp is not, generally speaking, an art; it is 
a way of seeing art. Burlesque is an art, albeit a minor and parasitic one. But 
burlesque is a parasite that draws life from its host without harming it; when 
camp becomes a parasite, it saps the very lifeblood of its object. 
Several years before Susan Sontag wrote her essay on camp, James 
Sutherland, in his book English Satire, sought to demean burlesque, which he 
found trivial in comparison with satire. To illustrate his conception of 
burlesque, he offered the following expression of the burlesque writer's art: 
When we meet with a poster in a London Underground station in 
which a moustache has been added to the face of some brightly smiling 
girl, we have the same sort of mentality at work. . . . (43) 
I hope that in light of the arguments offered in this paper, the reader will 
recognize that the poster with the moustache scrawled on it is not an example 
of burlesque, for it is not an independent artistic effort existing apart from its 
original. It is not camp, because it is not merely a perception of the poster, but 
rather an alteration of the original work of art in order to express a single, 
mocking point of view. The impulse which caused the moustache to be drawn 
is essentially destructive rather than creative. It does not really reflect a 
sensibility, because it has altered the object of its attention rather than merely 
appraising it. It is defacement—and if it is to be seen as representative of any 
of the phenomena discussed in this paper, it relates most closely to the process 
not whereby an original is burlesqued, but whereby it is camped. 
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